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Aline Sierp
Integrating Europe, Integrating Memories: 
The EU’s Politics of Memory since 1945
1  Introduction
World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to 
the dangers which threaten it. The contribution which an organized and living Europe can 
bring to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations. (Schuman, 
1950)
Robert Schuman’s1 words on 09 May 1950, proposing to place French and German 
coal and steel industries under a common High Authority – the forerunner of the 
European Commission – incorporate in an exemplary way the principles that have 
guided the initial integration process of the European Union. The determination 
to avoid another war among European nations has since then been central to the 
master narrative of European integration, being invoked particularly during cel-
ebrative commemorations of the founding instants of the European Union.2
What role has this narrative played during the different phases of the integra-
tion process? Can the experience of war and repression, genocide and dictator-
ship during WWII be regarded as the EU’s founding myth? When did the goal of a 
shared understanding of this seminal event gain prominence? If we presuppose 
that this emerging form of collective memory transcends nationally bound types 
of remembering, could an emerging collective European memory become the 
base for the formation of an overarching political identity?
By tracing the prominence of references made to the experiences of WWII 
in speeches by presidents of the High Authority and the European Commission 
between 1950 and 2009 on the one hand and in the different treaty-texts on the 
other, it will be possible to answer these questions and to establish the impor-
tance memories of WWII have had for the EU integration project and the emer-
gence of a collective European memory framework. The analysis of the different 
EU policy instruments and discussions on their implementation will furthermore 
shed light on the nature of this framework: Is it a truly transcultural framework 
1 French minister of Foreign Affairs.
2 As for example during celebrations of ”Europe Day” taking place each year on the 09 May in 
commemoration of the Schuman Declaration in 1950. ”Europe Day” became an official European 
celebrative day during the European Council meeting in Milan on 28/29 June 1985 but the recur-
rence of the Schuman Declaration had been celebrated with commemorative speeches by the 
European Institutions already before (Curti, 2005).
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that cuts across different national memory regimes? Does it integrate existing, 
more specific, frames of remembrance or does it try to create something new, thus 
overwriting these existing frameworks?
The terms “transnational” and “transcultural” are being used in reference 
to the subjects they substantiate. While transnational memory describes frame-
works that cut across memories tied to the narrow boundaries of national nation 
states, transcultural memory is a wider concept going beyond national frontiers 
cutting also across divisions present within national societies. It thus follows 
closely the definition given by Dirk Moses and Michael Rothberg in the opening 
chapter.
2  EU’s founding myths
Founding acts and political myths are important tools for political communities 
because they provide sources of political identity and legitimacy that go beyond 
the mechanisms of institutional democracy. Founding myths tend to emphasize 
the interruption with the past, the break with old traditions and the reorganisa-
tion of a community around new values. Political legitimacy is drawn from this. 
As Hannah Arendt puts it: “Legitimacy bases itself on an appeal to the past, while 
justification relates to an end that lies in the future” (Arendt, 1970). The histori-
cal correctness of the political myth in question is of limited importance in this 
context. What is important is its symbolic character that constitutes a powerful 
unifying force. It can create a WE-identity that gives meaning to the past and 
guidance for the future. “Political founding myths are narratives which bring 
about a collective identity beyond the social, cultural, and political fragmenta-
tion of a given community” (Probst 2003, 45). By appealing to common experi-
ences in the past, a sense of belonging is being generated within a social group. It 
creates a special bond among all those who can refer in one way or another to the 
evoked experience or seminal event. This process is not only limited to those who 
might have experienced the past personally but might include also those who 
share a sense of relevance regarding its memory. Founding myths thus influence 
the way people relate to each other and to others and are an important element 
in the development of a common identity. “The emergence of a common political 
culture is more than the abstract acceptance of universal principles. It is also the 
adoption of a narrative which creates identity” (Dewandre and Lenoble 1994, 97).
The creation of a shared narrative as the base of a founding myth necessar-
ily implies processes of selection and simplification. This is certainly true at the 
national level, where particularistic social and individual memories tend to get 
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homogenised into a coherent national narrative (see Assmann, 2007). We can 
presuppose that the situation on the supranational level looks similar. Applied to 
the EU context this would mean that the emergence of a European memory might 
transcend national forms of memory by creating an additional level where memo-
ries are homogenised and simplified. The question to be posed is whether this 
necessarily implies the erasure of national and local forms of remembrance or if 
it means the creation of a further supranational arena where diverging memories 
can find their expression. Dewandre and Lenoble’s reference to universal princi-
ples might give an indication of the possible basis for such an arena. It resonates 
with Levy and Sznaider’s (2002) idea of the globalisation of Holocaust memory 
which situates the Holocaust as an event disconnected from its historical origins 
and more as a universal symbol for human rights violations triggering political 
actions and reactions. In the European context this would mean that the sense of 
a shared past might facilitate the development of a narrative of identity based on 
universal values detached from national elements of memory and identity.
Following an analytical proposal by Giesen (1998), there are three modes of 
assimilating collective memories into a collective identity: the primordial, the tra-
ditional and the reflexive mode. The primordial mode bases identity on a mythi-
cal past. The traditional mode constructs collectives by transforming history into 
a story of glory and success. The reflexive mode presupposes a basic rupture 
with a glorious past and forces community members to take a reflexive view of 
themselves and others. While the primordial and the traditional modes are char-
acteristic for the construction of national identities, the reflexive mode might 
best describe the process pursued by the EU of constructing a symbolic space in 
which all the different European memories can be contained. To be able to test 
this hypothesis, we have to have a closer look at the different founding myths that 
have characterised EU history from its very beginning.
Europe has several foundation myths ranging from stories belonging to 
Greek mythology (“the rape of Europa”) to the first emergence of the idea of a 
European order during the Enlightenment. Considering the wealth of legends 
(true or false) it is not surprising that the question of the origins of Europe and 
the closely connected question of “what is European” has caused fierce debates 
during the European constitutional process. While ideas on the origin of Europe 
abound, the situation for the European Union as an economic and political 
entity, is much clearer. First proposals to found a European federation were 
made in the 1920s by Aristide Briand, French minister for Foreign Affairs. The 
idea of a united Europe was moreover repeatedly voiced by intellectuals3, politi-
3 See for example the speech by Léon Blum “L’Europe de Demain” on 14 October 1939, available 
from Centre d’action pour la federation européenne, Neuchâtel.
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cal associations4 and resistance movements5 before and during the two world 
wars. Concrete political action, however, was taken only after the end of WWII.
After the foundation of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Euro-
pean Economic Cooperation in 1948, France took the initiative for further eco-
nomic and political integration. The idea for the formation of the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) was borne out of the necessity to find a solution to 
the eminent end of the Marshall Plan. The speech made by the French minister of 
Foreign Affairs Robert Schuman (quoted above) on 9 May 1950 is conventionally 
regarded as having inaugurated what later was to become the European Union. 
References to WWII and the importance of peaceful relations among countries 
(particularly France and Germany) abound in Schuman’s speech and were sub-
sequently mentioned in the very first line of the Treaty establishing the ECSC in 
1951: “Considering that world peace can be safeguarded only by creative efforts 
commensurate with the dangers that threaten it” (European Coal and Steel Com-
munity, 1951).
However, we might, as Probst (2003, 48) points out, overestimate the ide-
ational motives of this founding story. One of the main reasons for France to 
propose to place French and German coal and steel industries under a common 
High Authority was its interest to limit Germany’s military and political power 
and to gain control over its steel industry.6 France’s ambitions were not met with 
opposition because they met in its turn the aims of the US and the Adenauer gov-
ernment to reintegrate Germany into the international community. Adenauer’s 
first comment about the Schumann plan was apparently: “That is our break-
through” (Judt 1994, 28–31). And even Jean Monnet mentioned ‘peace’ as being 
only one of the goals of the ECSC among many others. If we take into account the 
often very idealistic ideas connected to transcultural memory models, seeing the 
commemoration of the same historical event as the necessary glue that has the 
power to unify people on the one hand and trigger political actions on the other 
(in this case in order to secure peace), the example of the origins of the EU pro-
vides a good counterexample of the sometimes very diverging political interests 
that can shape cosmopolitan projects of any kind. The often presented transcul-
tural origin of the EU, the universal longing for peace and harmony, has certainly 
4 For example the Swiss “Europa-Union”.
5 See for example the text ‘Declaration on a European Cooperation’ drawn up on 31 March 1944 
in Paris by representatives of the Italian, French, Dutch, Norwegian, Danish, Yugoslav and Polish 
resistance movements, available from Centre d’action pour la federation européenne, Neuchâtel.
6 Before presenting the Schuman plan, the French government had tried to come to an agree-
ment about the exploitation of the German raw material with the Soviet Union. Only after this 
attempt had failed, did France decide to change its strategy.
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not been the only rationale behind the creation of the ECSC, proving once more 
the mythical aspect of the founding of the EU. This becomes even clearer when 
analysing the role the EU’s origins have played during the Cold War.
3  The Cold War
References to the experience of war and dictatorship that were still present in the 
“founding fathers’” speeches and in the Union’s first treaty, almost completely 
disappeared in speeches made by European Commission presidents during the 
Cold War. Already in the text of the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1957, the aspiration to safeguard peace and liberty among 
its members is mentioned last among the many aims of the community (Euro-
pean Economic Community, 1957). Speeches commemorating the Schuman Dec-
laration make reference to the great achievements of the ECSC and the EEC and 
underline the importance of the existence of economic and political cooperation, 
but say very little about the experience of war and dictatorship being at the origin 
of this cooperation.
This might be explained by the fact that memories of the seminal events that 
the founding myth of the EU was harking back to were far from being uniform 
across countries. The reconstruction of memories of WWII had been from the 
beginning a predominantly national affair, guided by the political need to protect 
the positive self-image of the nation. Memories were considered to be politically 
explosive and unusable during an era when Europe was both divided and bound 
together by a sharp ideological contest between East and West. Memories of the 
recent past were frozen and political images and interpretations adjusted to the 
political status quo of the Cold War (Judt 1992, 83–119). A form of collective amnesia 
was the result and any reference to Europe’s contested heritage was omitted from 
public speeches by political actors. If we analyse contemporary discourses on 
memory, we can still see traces of this tendency to avoid active confrontation, 
particularly with those memories that hark back to the division of the continent 
during the Cold War Years. The best examples of this are certainly the debates 
surrounding the installation of a remembrance day for all victims of totalitarian 
regimes on August 23rd. It could be argued that the mere attempt to create some 
kind of an overarching transcultural memory that has the power to overlay more 
localised commemorative discourses is a new attempt to express the wish for a 
form of amnesia through the conscious homogenisation of conflictual memories.
However, whilst the Cold War might have impeded active confrontation with 
the past, its ideological confrontation with Communism may also have contrib-
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uted to further European integration. It has been suggested by several scholars 
that more than the memory of the traumatic experiences of WWII, it had been 
the division of Europe into East and West that has fostered European coopera-
tion (Thum, 2004). The opposition of the Soviet Union on the one hand and 
the European Community on the other had created a sense of community and 
directed major attention towards common interests that was able to cover many 
of the real existing differences (including divisions concerning memories of the 
past) between the Western European states. This is not to say that transcultural 
cohesion of any kind has an ideological basis. It only suggests that it is often the 
outcome of other needs and political requirements of that particular moment in 
history that might foster the development of a transcultural project.
4  After 1989
The fragility of this construct became obvious in 1989 when the breaking open of 
the bipolar political world resulted in an eruptive return of memory and a reawak-
ening of history. After a period of strongly stylised and standardised ideas of the 
past, many countries started to slowly face conflicting, painful and embarrassing 
memories. It was particularly the opening up of archives, allowing for increased 
research activity into the circumstances of WWII and the Holocaust, that resulted 
in a more differentiated vision of victims and collaborators, often correcting the 
national memory constructs that had been built in the first 30 years after the end 
of WWII. The crumbling of national myths made a new confrontation with ques-
tions of guilt and responsibility for the WWII events necessary and allowed for 
the first attempts of talking about a “European memory”. Already in the 1980s, 
discussions of “European values” had frequently, but by no means exclusively, 
addressed the legacy of twentieth-century warfare and genocide in Europe (Speth, 
1999). The institutional consolidation of the EU in the 1990s and in particular the 
forceful confrontation with the memory of Communism (often called the “second 
Totalitarianism of the 20th century”) led to the increased understanding of WWII 
as a European War and of Fascism/Nazism as a European phenomenon.
This can be clearly seen when looking at public commemorative speeches in 
different European member states. Particularly in the past 20 years a clear shift 
away from a very nationally focused dealing with the legacy of WWII towards a 
more cosmopolitan way of addressing questions of guilt and responsibility can 
be discerned. A similar development can be seen on the European level. In light 
of the end of the Cold War, the original sources of inspiration that had led to the 
construction of the EU right after the Second World War came back to the fore. 
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“We have to employ more than ever our intellectual power and our political will 
in order to build the European house whose foundations however have to remain 
the original ideas of Robert Schuman”, said Frans Andriessen (1990), the Vice-
President of the European Commission, on 09 May 1990. He is echoing Jacques 
Delors’ words pronounced one day earlier during the commemorative celebra-
tions of ‘Europe Day’, in which Delors had underlined the relevance Schuman’s 
original ideas still have for the European project:
…I would like to quote a phrase of the speech Robert Schuman made in the Collège de 
Bruges in October 1953: “Our initial considerations were of a much less economic than polit-
ical nature. Detoxify the relationship between France and Germany, secure peace, create 
a climate of cooperation across Europe. This was our main aim.” If we replaced the word 
“France” with a list of all the European countries, this declaration would be as relevant 
today as it was forty years ago. (Delors, 1990)
Speeches in the 1990s are not only characterised by a reawakened interest in 
the original aims of European integration but also by a more open dealing with 
Europe’s painful heritage. On 09 May 1994 Sir Leon Brittan, Vice President of the 
European Commission, does not only underline today’s relevance of the princi-
ples evoked by Schuman in 1950 but connects the 9 May to two significant dates 
of WWII: the 9 May 1940, when Hitler ordered the invasion of the Netherlands, 
Belgium and France and the 9 May 1945, “the first full day of freedom” (Brittan, 
1994). He dedicates a large part of his speech to the recollection of “the darkest 
period of its [Europe’s] history for many centuries” (Brittan, 1994), before empha-
sizing the importance of this era for the development of the guiding principles 
of today’s EU: “These foundations, these values, [democracy, liberty, equality, 
solidarity, justice] spring from our continent’s history and experiences. They have 
always continued to shine in Europe even, as in 1940, when it seemed that dark-
ness had all but engulfed us” (Brittan, 1994).
The growing time period between the events of WWII and the present day, 
the arrival of new generations and their emotional distance to the recollections of 
their parents, and the slow disappearance of contemporary witnesses allowed for 
a more direct confrontation with the experience of war and dictatorship. Levy and 
Sznaider (2002, 96) identify three central changes in this context: (1) a genera-
tional transition from social to historical memories; (2) a growing historicization 
of WWII; (3) the identification of the Holocaust as unique with reference to the 
past and universal for the future. It was particularly the new focus on the Holo-
caust that started to dominate the public dealing with Europe’s recent past from 
the end of the 1990s onwards.
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5  The Holocaust
In the immediate post-war years, the Holocaust did not permeate public dis-
course, nor was its commemoration in any form institutionalized. It had been 
originally conceived as part of a larger practice of war crimes in an almost endless 
list of Nazi cruelties (Levy and Sznaider 2002, 94). Taking into account Germa-
ny’s initial desire to forget about this aspect of the Third Reich and considering 
other countries’ attempts to cover up instances of anti-Semitism and collabora-
tion in deportation, it is not surprising that, in contrast to the desire to prevent 
another war among European countries, the genocide was of no significance for 
early western integration. In the years between 1950 and 1989, when political 
and intellectual debates about the ongoing process of west European integration 
focused on the future of the European project, the Holocaust – as a central point 
of reference or even as a founding act – was never mentioned. Neither in public 
speeches, nor in the treaties, is reference made to the role the Holocaust might 
have played in defining the original values or the political goals of the European 
Union (Probst 2003, 54).
Andrew Beattie might therefore be right when he says that “recent attempts 
to transform the Holocaust into the EU’s foundational myth […] rewrite and 
distort the historical record” (2007, 16). The interpretation of the Holocaust as 
founding act is, of course, only plausible from an ex-post perspective. It never-
theless has to be understood within a certain context, namely as an attempt to 
create an overarching political identity beyond the institutional framework of the 
EU. Dan Diner argues in this context that the commemoration of the Holocaust is 
increasingly becoming the core of a unifying European memory, giving constitu-
tion building in Europe the necessary symbolic foundation: “The ethical impera-
tives of this founding act constitute a catalogue of values which are of normative 
importance for a political Europe” (Diner, 2000). That the commemoration of the 
Holocaust – as an event which gives meaning – is not only a source of symbolic 
legitimacy but also of political action and values, can be seen by the determina-
tion the EU demonstrates when it comes to the rejection of racism, anti-Semi-
tism, and xenophobia. The joint Motion for a Resolution on remembrance of the 
Holocaust, anti-Semitism and racism voted on by the European Parliament on 
27 January 2005 reads:
The sixtieth anniversary of the liberation of Nazi Germany’s death camp at Auschwitz-Birke-
nau […] is not only a major occasion for European citizens to remember and condemn the 
enormous horror and tragedy of the Holocaust, but also for addressing the disturbing rise 
in anti-Semitism and especially anti-Semitic incidents in Europe, and for learning anew the 
wider lessons about the dangers of victimising people on the basis of race, ethnic origin, 
religion, political or sexual orientation, or social classification (European Parliament, 2005).
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It is striking that all previous resolutions on racism, xenophobia and anti-
Semitism by the European Parliament7 also make reference to the Holocaust. 
It has become the yardstick with which other political developments are being 
measured and evaluated. This became particularly evident during the Balkan 
crisis and the unsuccessful NATO intervention in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995, 
when military involvement in Kosovo was primarily framed as a moral obligation 
largely in response to previous failures to intervene on behalf of innocent civil-
ians. Similar lines of argument could be perceived during disputes on military 
interventions in Rwanda, Iraq or Afghanistan. As Aleida Assmann puts it: “The 
Holocaust has not become a single universally shared memory, but it has become 
the paradigm or template through which other genocides and historical traumas 
are very often perceived and presented” (Assmann 2007, 14).
The importance the Holocaust has acquired in the past years can also be 
seen by the number of initiatives that have been taken in the last decennial in 
order to anchor its memory firmly to the institutional setting. Already in 1995 the 
European Parliament passed a resolution on a day to commemorate the Holo-
caust (European Parliament, 1995) but the first concrete step into this direction 
was taken in 2000 by the Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson, who invited 
representatives of sixteen nations (among them thirteen present and future 
members of the European Union) to a forum to discuss and define a common 
framework for commemorating and teaching the Holocaust. When in 2002 the 
Council of Europe decided to introduce a continent-wide Day of Remembrance, 
albeit with the flexibility for individual countries to select the most appropriate 
date, most countries did choose 27 January, confirming its transversal meaning 
and transforming it into a truly European memorial day. In addition to national 
initiatives, since 2000 the 27th of January is being officially commemorated by 
representatives of the European institutions as well, making it, together with 
“Europe-Day”, one of the few European commemoration dates that are being 
celebrated transnationally.8
7 27 October 1994, published in Official Journal C 323, 21.11.1994, p. 154; 27 April 1995, published 
in Official Journal C 126, 22.5.1995, p. 75; 26 October 1995, published in Official Journal C 308, 
20.11.1995, p. 140; 30 January 1997, published in Official Journal C 55, 24.2.1997, p. 17 and 16 March 
2000, published in Official Journal C 377, 29.12.2000, p. 366.
8 Even though Europe was the stage for the Holocaust, the memory of it is no longer specifically 
European but extends far beyond Europe’s boundaries. On 24 January 2005, the United Nations 
for the first time in its history commemorated the Holocaust in a special session and on 01 No-
vember 2005, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution designating 27 January as “Interna-
tional Day of Commemoration in memory of the victims of the Holocaust”.
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6  Memory and Identity
The question that remains is: why has there been such a renewed interest in 
Europe’s past after statesmen had focused much more on the future throughout 
the Cold War? Aleida Assmann’s contention that the future has lost much of its 
power to integrate, while the past is becoming increasingly important for the 
formation of identity (Assmann 2007, 11) may explain this. Until the 1980s, the 
EU was mainly an economic, legal-political entity. It had few shared values and 
symbols, and could certainly not be called a community of memory (Beattie 2007, 
1). When it became clear that economic prosperity and the images of a market 
community do not suffice to create a feeling of belonging, “the promotion of a 
shared historical consciousness became part of a larger attempt to imbue the dry 
bureaucratic and economic process of European integration with a common iden-
tity” (Speth, 1999).
Since the 1990s, historians have argued that very similar mechanisms are 
at work regarding the “memory work” of an individual nation and of the Euro-
pean community.9 Many political scientists are likewise convinced that the main 
device for generating a collective sense of identity in a complex society such as 
the European one lies in the mode of remembering the past and argue that Europe 
needs a memory in order to build a common identity, just as nations do.10 Going 
back to the proposal by Giesen (1998), the question emerges which model the 
development of the EU narrative followed. The above analysis suggests that par-
ticularly the first years of European integration followed a model closer to the 
traditional mode than to the reflexive one. The avoidance of conflictual memory 
discourses during the Cold War and the exclusive concentration on the integra-
tion success story hints at this. It could be argued that the commemoration of 
the Holocaust, seen as a transcultural symbol for human rights violations, could 
serve as an example for the emerging reflexive mode. However, if the reflexive 
mode according to Giesen implies a “rupture with a glorious past” and “forces 
community members to take a reflexive view of themselves and others”, the mere 
reference to the Holocaust as a counter-element to the values of the European 
Union is not enough. A true reflection on the elements that make up a narrative, 
including positive and negative memories, would be necessary in this instance.
So far the analysis suggests that the construction of a European memory goes 
hand in hand with homogenisation and simplification rather than the manifesta-
tion of a diverse commemorative climate open to multiple interpretations of the 
past. First elements of the reflexive mode might only be discerned when looking 
9 See for example Kaelble (1995).
10 See for example Eder (2005); Geremek (1998).
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at the debates that precede the drawing up of resolutions and recommendations. 
Those are the moments when the EU becomes an arena for debate and conflict, 
where different memory regimes oppose each other, can find their expression 
and are listened to. The emergence of a reflexive awareness of the coexistence of 
the dreadful past of perpetrators with the traumatic past of victims, in particu-
lar, might slowly create a feeling of collective responsibility, going beyond flags 
and coins and the sense of belonging created by the simple membership in the 
European community. “Europe, on the fast track to integration, seems more and 
more to be finding a common unifying memory in the events of World War II”, 
writes Dan Diner in the New German Critique (2003, 36). Is a collective European 
memory of WWII emerging?
7  A European memory?
Collective memory can manifest itself in a variety of forms: as incorporated col-
lective memory in the minds of people, as objectified memory in the form of 
museums and monuments (“lieux de mémoire”), and as institutionalized memory 
in curricula and rituals of remembering. Since the 1990s the European Union has 
made increasing efforts to frame the emergence of a European objectified and 
institutionalised memory. The installation of two official European remembrance 
days (Europe Day and Holocaust Memorial Day) and the frequent reference that 
is made in official speeches to the “bitter experiences common to all Europe-
ans”, are but two examples of this. Impulses to commemorate the events of WWII 
within a transnational framework have particularly come from historians, who 
started to change the perspective in their research from a national to a European 
one. The project Lieux de mémoire for example, launched for France by Pierre 
Nora and his colleagues in 1981 has been successfully imitated in other Euro-
pean countries in search for shared “European sites of memory”. On the fiftieth 
anniversary of the founding of the European Community the Musée de l’Europe 
opened in Brussels and various European research teams – funded by the Euro-
pean Science Foundation – are engaged in investigating key historical events that 
make up the European imaginaire.11
11 For example the research project on European historiography conducted by the Ludwig 
Boltzmann Institute for European History and Public Spheres, see http://ehp.lbg.ac.at or the 
project “United Europe-Divided Memory” carried out by the Vienna Institute for Human Sci-
ences, see http://www.iwm.at.
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National initiatives are especially taken up by the European Commission, 
which is funding a series of remembrance projects as part of its Democracy 
campaign,12 an initiative launched in 2005 to mark the 60th anniversary of the 
fall of Nazism. Its objective is to foster “action, debate and reflection related 
to European citizenship and democracy, shared values, common history and 
culture, and bringing Europe closer to its citizens by promoting Europe’s values 
and achievements, while preserving the memory of its past” (European Com-
mission, 2008). History is clearly seen as one unifying element, allowing for the 
reflection on the past and the definition of values for the present.
The situation is, however, not as clear-cut as the European Commission likes 
to suggest. There is probably little disagreement about the values for the present 
and the future, but still a lot over those of the past. As Aleida Assman puts it: 
“There are political norms and standards for a peaceful coexistence within the 
European Union, but there are as yet no norms and standards for the peace-
ful coexistence of European memories” (Assmann 2007, 19). Peter Esterházy 
expresses a similar opinion: “What was supposed to be united has been torn 
apart in self-hatred and self-pity […]. Besides the untruth of the exclusive per-
petrator, there is the untruth of the exclusive victim, and the unspoken “we” of 
the national memory lies hidden beneath both […]. A common European knowl-
edge about ourselves as both perpetrators and victims is not yet in view” (Ester-
házy 2004, 16). The extent to which simplistic memory constellations continue 
to divide more often than unite became evident in an exemplary way during the 
European constitutional debate, when the Polish head of state demanded that 
the number of Polish Nazi victims needed to be counted when assessing correctly 
Poland’s proportional votes in today’s Europe. Examples such as this illustrate 
the need to move beyond the optimistic view of memory constellations as put 
forward by scholars like Levy and Sznaider and take into account the potentially 
negative impact that simplistic memory constellations can have if they are used 
as a political tool. A shared European understanding of the past can certainly 
only develop if inherited, primarily national approaches to history are being over-
come, opening the door towards a transcultural form of European memory that 
is open to discussion and debate and enhances dialogue between nations, rather 
than being smothered into a constructed transcendental narrative.
The European Union is undoubtedly trying to frame this development 
through the initiatives mentioned above. Following the line of thought of Klaus 
Eder (2005), it is precisely the “self-organizing dynamics of remembering the 
process of coordinating particular memories in an institutionally bounded com-
12 In 2007 the ‘Democracy Campaign’ became part of the ‘Europe for Citizens Programme’. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/programme-actions/doc48_en.htm
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municative space”, that might allow for the emergence of a transcultural memory 
that transgresses the confines of nationally determined memories. Eder assumes 
that if nationally bounded memories are reorganized on a higher level, a process 
of reflective abstraction takes place that generates higher ordered principles for 
remembering a collective past. While the EU is aspiring to reach this goal, it is 
exactly the weakness of the ‘institutionally bounded communicative space’ and 
the lack of symbolic power that is nevertheless still hampering this process.13
Any discussion of a European memory would furthermore have to include 
reflections on the division of Europe during the Cold War and the diverging 
memory frameworks that developed in East and West in consequence – a topic 
that the EU has not addressed sufficiently to date. How difficult the integration 
of different memory structures can be became evident after the reunification of 
Germany.14 A united Europe will have to face the same questions and problems 
with regards coming to terms with its own past if it wants to arrive at a common 
understanding of the EU’s “founding myth”.
8  Conclusions
The above analysis shows clearly how the perception and reception of this myth 
has changed over the years. While the need to avoid any repetition of military 
conflict between European states guided the initial integration process of the 
European Union, it was mainly the pressure for internal unity that provided the 
main rationale during the Cold War, causing the disappearance of references 
made to Europe’s painful divisive past from most public memory discourses. The 
end of the Cold War did not only revive those conflicting, painful and embar-
rassing memories, allowing for a more differentiated view of them, but led at the 
same time to the increased understanding of WWII as a European war and of 
Fascism/Nazism as a European phenomenon.
Since the 1990s, more than the aim of avoiding another war among Europe-
ans, it is the memory of the common experience of repression, dictatorship and 
genocide that turned into the point of reference for the definition of the Union’s 
values and political goals. The existence of a catalogue of shared principles stem-
ming from the experiences of a common past is furthermore seen as being the 
starting point for the creation of an overarching political identity going beyond 
13 The same argument is usually applied to the European identity debate.
14 See for example Herf (1997).
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the institutional framework of the EU. The EU’s attempts to actively frame the 
development of a collective European memory can be understood in this context.
Despite the positive signals coming from the EU’s initiatives, simplistic 
national memory constellations and the Union’s lack of legitimacy and symbolic 
power still hamper the development of a shared European understanding of the 
past. A clear conflict still seems to exist between the culture of memory developed 
over the past 20 years – which shows early traces of a transcultural mode but 
failed to go much beyond the mere homogenization of already existing national 
forms of memory – on the one hand and a more self-reflexive “ideal” form that 
truly fosters dialogue among nations on the other.
There are certainly still many steps to be taken on the Union’s road to inte-
gration before we can effectively speak about a collective European memory that 
allows citizens to reflect without feelings of guilt or anger about the events that 
were at the origins of the EU. Yet despite the fact that the idea of a common Euro-
pean memory still seems to be more of a vision than a reality, it is certainly the 
great potential the project of European unification inherently possesses. What 
remains to be questioned is the desirability of such a project and the implications 
it has for the integration of immigrants into European society. Particularly with 
respect to the latter point it might precisely be the emergence of a transcultural 
framework that can fulfil this aim better than a transnational framework tied to 
narrow national boundaries.
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